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QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW 
Respondent presents no questions for review. 
REFERENCE TO COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
The Court of Appeals Opinion is reported at Martinez v. 
Martinez, 80 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (April 26, 1988). 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Respondent does not dispute Petitioner's jurisdictional 
statement. 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
26 U.S.C. Section 152 (included in Appendix 6, 
Petitioned to the Supreme Court of Utah for Writ of 
Certiorari). 
Article VI, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which 
provides in part: 
"This Constitution, and the Laws of the 
United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges 
in every State shall be bound thereby, 
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws 
of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding." (Capitalization from 
original) 
The Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which 
provides that: 
"The Congress shall have power to lay 
and collect taxes on incomes, from 
whatever source derived, . . . ." 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant respectfully objects to the factual assertions 
made in Respondent's Petition on the basis that essentially 
all relevant facts set forth therein are either totally 
misstated or are taken out of context and do not accurately 
reflect the facts of the case. 
At the time of the trial, the parties had been married 
nearly 17 years. At the time of the marriage both parties 
were high school graduates, and Respondent was employed by 
the Army but did not remember his salary at the time of the 
trial. (Transcript, page 4, lines 23-24, hereinafter T4, 23-
24). During the marriage Defendant obtained a bachelor1s 
degree from Weber State College, a medical degree from the 
University of Utah School of Medicine, completed an 
internship at the Gysinger Medical Center in Danville, 
Pennsylvania, and had completed a residency as an emergency 
room physician at the same institution. He was employed in 
the first year of a two year contract which provided a salary 
of $100,000.00 per year. (T8, 25). From this $100,000.00 
per year, the Defendant testified that he had approximately 
$7,100.00 in practice-related expenditures, leaving him with 
a gross personal income of $92,900.00 per year or $7,741.67 
per month. (T10-12 and T66, 24). It should also be noted 
that Defendant was able to command this salary without 
having yet become board certified as an emergency room 
specialist. (T8, 17-20). At the time that the parties 
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separated and Plaintiff returned to the State of Utah, 
Defendant had completed all but six month's of his residency, 
and had admitted to Plaintiff that he had been having an 
extra-marital affair which he was not willing to discontinue. 
(T20, 2-17). He had further earlier expressed an 
unwillingness to take part in marriage counseling to attempt 
to solve the parties' marital difficulties. (T20, 18-22). 
Under these circumstances, Plaintiff and the children 
returned to the State of Utah where she filed this action for 
divorce. 
During the marriage Plaintiff had quit her job in Utah 
to accompany Defendant to Germany where the parties eked out 
an existence on the income of a junior enlisted person and 
started their family. (T4, 18-22 and T29, 19-13). In his 
Petition, Respondent claims that a portion of the schooling 
and living expenses experienced by the party during the 
marriage were paid for by "his" veteran's benefits. However, 
any "earning" of this benefit was participated in by 
Plaintiff who experienced the financial hardships associated 
with living in Europe on a junior enlisted person's pay right 
along with Defendant. 
After Defendant's discharge from the Army, he obtained 
employment at Hill Air Force Base as an electronics 
technician at an income which he recalled to be approximately 
$9,000.00 per year. (T5, 18-12). This figure is 
substantially below the income figure shown as an average for 
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a high school graduate and utilized by Plaintiff's experts at 
the time of trial, that sum being $33,600.00 per year. (T83, 
4) . 
Plaintiff concedes that Defendant continued to work and 
support the family during the period of time that he obtained 
the college education. However, during this time he devoted 
considerable time and effort to the pursuit of the education, 
and Plaintiff was required to bear a larger portion of the 
family responsibilities than would normally be the case, 
(T30, 1-5 and 10-14) in addition to which she was employed 
outside of the home to the maximum extent feasible under the 
circumstances then existing. (T34, 13-23 and T7, 16-17). At 
trial she pointed out that her employment possibilities were 
limited by child care expenses, and that her employment 
outside the home was therefore essentially restricted to 
times when Defendant would be at home to care for the 
children. (T35, 1-10). Under these circumstances it was 
evident at trial that her employment outside the home for six 
years represented a sacrifice by the entire family, but this 
was one of the sacrifices paid as part of the investment 
decision based upon the expectation of substantially 
increased future income and benefits which would be available 
to the entire family. (T33, 15-20 and T34, 19). The 
magnitude of the sacrifices made is clearly evident 
throughout the record before the Court, and included the 
parties living in a home which was not much more than a shack 
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in a sparsely populated rural area of Pennsylvania with no 
telephone, no close neighbors, and income which did not even 
provide adequate funds for the parties1 children to buy 
school lunch. (T36, 1-4 and T37, 18-19). In addition, 
during this time, the testimony was clear that Defendant 
refused to allow Plaintiff to work in any fast food or other 
types of restaurants where she might otherwise be able to 
find a job with her limited employment skills. (T37, 1-4). 
In Defendant's Exhibit A he claims that Plaintiff worked for 
only three years during the marriage, when in fact his own 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari he admits that she also 
worked during 1978, 1979 and 1980 as a waitress but these 
years are omitted from the Defendant's exhibit. (Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari page 7). An analysis of his dates 
reflects that she worked at least six and one-half years 
before being precluded from further work by the move to 
Pennsylvania where Plaintiff could not find work despite a 
diligent search. (T36, 6-25 and T37, 1-4). 
During the marriage, Plaintiff admitted to being 
extremely concerned about the marriage being able to survive 
additional stress and sacrifices required for Defendant to 
complete medical school. (T31, 1-8 and 13-21). However, she 
also testified that she had been repeatedly assured that if 
she and the children would support this investment concept, 
her sacrifices would be more than made up to them by the 
significantly increased income and standard of living, and in 
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his flexible time as a physician which would enable him to 
see the children more. (T33, 17-21). The fact that she was 
reluctant to make sacrifices of that magnitude on an ongoing 
basis only highlights the extent of her "contribution1' to the 
investment matrix pursuit by the family entity. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS1 DECISION CREATING THE 
REMEDY OF EQUITABLE RESTITUTION IS THE COURT! S 
ANSWER TO A PROBLEM ADDRESSED IN PREVIOUS CASES 
FOR WHICH A REMEDY WAS NECESSARY. 
In Peterson v. Peterson, 737 P. 2d 237 at 242 (Utah App. 
1987), the Utah Court of Appeals addresses the problem of 
reimbursing a spouse who has sacrificed to help the other 
spouse attain education but is divorced before the fruits of 
that education are realized. In footnote 4, the Peterson 
Court says that "rehabilitative" or "reimbursement" alimony, 
not terminable upon remarriage, may be the creative remedy 
necessary to achieve fairness in such cases. The Court cites 
Wisconsin and New Jersey decisions as examples. Haugan v. 
Haugan, 117 Wis.2d 200, 343 N.W.2nd 796 (1984) and Mahoney v. 
Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982). The Court's 
creation of the equitable restitution remedy is merely a form 
of reimbursement or rehabilitative alimony to compensate the 
sacrificing spouse when a division of assets would be wholly 
inadequate. In the case at bar, the parties1 main asset was 
a house valued at $63,000.00, hardly sufficient to compensate 
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Mrs. Martinez for having sacrificed and supported the 
Defendant during 17 years of marriage while the Defendant 
earned both his bachelors and M.D. degrees. In Peterson, the 
Utah Court of Appeals awarded Mrs. Peterson $1,000.00 per 
month alimony and characterized the Trial Court's 
$120,000.00 cash settlement representing Mrs. Peterson's 
interest in her husband's medical degree as additional 
alimony making a total alimony award of $2,000.00 per month. 
In Martinez, the Court of Appeals awarded Mrs. Martinez 
permanent alimony in the amount of $750.00 per month and 
created the remedy of equitable restitution to repay Mrs. 
Martinez for her sacrifice, similar to the $120,000.00 cash 
settlement awarded in Peterson. 
In Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238 (Utah App. 1987), 
the Court affirmed the Peterson decision holding that 
although an advanced degree is not property, the disparity in 
earning potential is a factor in the alimony analysis. 
However, in Rayburn, the parties were not married until Dr. 
Rayburn had already obtained his M.D. degree and there were 
substantial assets to be divided. In addition, Mrs. Rayburn 
already had a masters degree and the Court presumes she was 
capable of earning substantial income particularly after the 
rehabilitative alimony awarded allowed her to obtain further 
education. The Rayburn Court reiterates the Peterson 
decision that in cases such as the Martinez case where the 
parties are divorced before there are sufficient assets to 
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compensate the supporting spouse, "an award of non-terminable 
rehabilitative or reimbursement alimony would be 
appropriate." Icl. at 241. 
The Utah Supreme Court also recognizes the need for some 
type of rehabilitative or reimbursement payment to the 
supporting spouse. In Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P. 2d 1076 at 
1081 (Utah 1988), the Court points out that the Gardner case 
involved a long term marriage where the fruits of the M.D. 
degree were available to be divided. The Court recognizes 
that in cases where there are not sufficient assets to 
compensate the supporting spouse, "equity and fairness 
required another solution." Equitable restitution is the 
Court of Appeals1 "other" solution to the problem addressed 
in Peterson, Rayburn, and Gardner. 
Defendant and his counsel were fully advised early in 
the proceeding that Plaintiff was claiming an interest in the 
medical degree as a part of the marital assets accumulated 
during the marriage. (Stipulation And Settlement Agreement 
paragraph 9, February, 1983). Defendant had adequate 
opportunity to present expert testimony at the trial of the 
case to establish the value of that medical degree or to 
challenge Plaintifffs valuation thereof, but elected not to 
do so at the trial. Two experts retained by Plaintiff, a 
certified financial advisor and the professor of economics 
from Utah State University valued the flow of income 
attributable to the medical degree in excess of that which 
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w o u l d be e a r n e d by t h e a v e r a g e h i g h s c h o o l g r a d u a t e w i t h i n 
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s u s i n g $ 3 3 , 6 0 0 . 0 0 p e r y e a r a s t h e a v e r a g e 
h i g h s c h o o l g r a d u a t e ! s i n c o m e , a sum f a r i n e x c e s s o f t h a t 
e a r n e d b y D e f e n d a n t p r i o r t o t h e c o m m e n c e m e n t o f t h e 
e d u c a t i o n a l p r o c e s s . The v a l u e s p l a c e d by t h e e x p e r t s w e r e 
1 . 8 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s a n d 1 . 7 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
( T 8 2 , 17 ; T 8 3 , 1 8 ; and T71 , 1 0 ) . The d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e two 
v a l u a t i o n s was e x p l a i n e d a s b e i n g c a u s e d by a d i f f e r e n c e i n 
t h e g r o s s i n c o m e f i g u r e s u t i l i z e d b y t h e r e s p e c t i v e 
w i t n e s s e s , o n e h a v i n g u t i l i z e d t h e e s t i m a t e d c o s t o f 
$ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 p e r y e a r b a s e d u p o n p r e - t r i a l d i s c o v e r y 
i n d i c a t i o n s , and t h e o t h e r b e i n g b a s e d on t h e a c t u a l c o s t o f 
d o i n g b u s i n e s s t e s t i f i e d t o by Dr. M a r t i n e z o f $ 7 , 1 0 0 . 0 0 p e r 
y e a r . ( T 6 6 , 2 1 - 2 4 ; T 6 7 , 7 ( 9 ) ; T 8 3 , 2 1 - 2 5 ; and T 8 4 , 1 - 4 ) . 
B o t h w i t n e s s e s t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e c o n c e p t o f "human c a p i t a l " 
and i n v e s t m e n t i n s u c h human c a p i t a l was a r e a d i l y a c c e p t e d 
c o n c e p t w i t h i n t h e f i e l d o f e c o n o m i c s and o n e s u b j e c t t o 
r e a s o n a b l e v a l u a t i o n b a s e d upon t h e d a t a a v a i l a b l e t o t h e 
e x p e r t s . ( T 6 4 , 7 - 9 and T 7 9 . 5 - 1 0 ) . 
POINT I I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DECIDED THAT UNDER 
FEDERAL LAW THE CUSTODIAL PARENT IS ENTITLED TO 
TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR THE CHILDREN UNLESS THERE IS A 
PRE-1985 INSTRUMENT ORDERING OTHERWISE. 
T h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s c o r r e c t l y d e c i d e d t h a t u n d e r 
f e d e r a l l a w , t h e c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t i s e n t i t l e d t o t a x 
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exemptions for the children unless there is a pre-1985 
instrument ordering otherwise. As Appellant argued on 
appeal, Section 152 of 26 U.S.C. outlines the federal law for 
income tax exemptions. The Supremacy clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, Article IV, Clause 2, says that the laws of the 
United States shall be the Supreme Law of the Land. The 
Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that 
Congress has the power to collect taxes on income. Thus, 
federal law would preempt any state law to the contrary. 
The Petitioner cites Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 
(Utah 1987) for the proposition that the Trial Court can 
distribute tax exemptions equitably. The case in fact stands 
for the proposition that issues can be adjudicated although 
not plead. The Utah Supreme Court says in Newmeyer that the 
Trial Court can adjudicate "such issues" as tax exemptions 
even when the issues are not raised in the pleadings under 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure, 15(b). Id. at 1279. The Court 
says nothing about the tax exemption issue per se. The Court 
no gives indication that it even considered or was aware of 
the 1984 Tax Reform Act and its affect on 26 U.S.C. Section 
152(e). Mrs. Newmeyer's prayer for relief gave the tax 
exemption to Mr. Newmeyer, the non-custodial parent. The 
Trial Court awarded the exemption to Mrs. Newmeyer after 
adjudication and Mr. Newmeyer argues on appeal that the issue 
was not plead and therefore should not have been heard. The 
Utah Court upholds the Trial Court but does not refer to 
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federal law at all and the case can hardly be considered a 
definitive holding on the tax exemption issue. 
In Martinez, the Utah Court of Appeals, having decided 
that there was no longer a pre-1985 instrument to qualify as 
an exception to the rule in U.S.C. Section 152(e), correctly 
decides that the custodial parent is entitled to the tax 
exemptions for the children under federal law. The Utah 
statute relied upon by the Petitioner is silent as to the tax 
exemption issue. U.C.A. Section 30-3-5 (1987) would be 
preempted by federal law even if it were specific on the tax 
exemption issue. 
POINT III 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' MODIFICATION OF ALIMONY AND 
CHILD SUPPORT AWARDS WAS BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD. 
The record in this case includes a 137 page transcript 
and 10 exhibits. The transcript includes testimony as to 
Mrs. Martinez1 income (T42, 6-25) and her monthly expenses 
including a list of many needed home repairs and appliances 
that needed to be replaced or repaired (T41, 9-13 and 
Plaintiff's Exhibit F). There was testimony as to Dr. 
Martinez1 gross and net earnings. (T8, 25 and T103, 4-8). 
The value of the parties1 only major asset, the home, was 
stipulated to as was the equity and was outlined in exhibits. 
(T24, 17-19 and Plaintiff's Exhibits B, C, D and E). 
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Petitioner complains that the Utah Court of Appeals set 
alimony based on Dr. Martinez1 future income which was 
speculative. At the time of trial, Dr. Martinez was not yet 
board certified but was earning $100,000.00 per year on a two 
year contract. While there was no evidence of future 
employment or potential income in the record, an assumption 
that he could earn as much after becoming board certified as 
he had before is certainly not too speculative. 
The Trial Court's award was a clear abuse of discretion 
and amounted to manifest injustice and inequity. The Utah 
Court of Appeals substituted its own judgment for that of the 
Trial Court based on substantial evidence in the record 
following the standard for review outlined in Gardner v. 
Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 at 1076 (Utah 1988) citing Turner v. 
Turner , 649 P.2d 6 at 8 (Utah 1982), and Peterson v. 
Peterson, 737 P.2d 237 at 239 (Utah App. 1987) also citing 
Turner. In addition, the Martinez decision analyzes its 
child support award and award of alimony by Utah common law 
criteria. 
At the trial, Plaintiff presented all evidence 
reasonably necessary to the establishment of a child support 
and alimony award, in addition to any value necessary for the 
decree itself. Defendant had adequate opportunity to present 
whatever evidence he felt appropriate to the same subject. 
Any shortcoming in the record, is as a result of Defendant's 
failure to adequately present the case to the trial court, 
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and certainly does not justify a remand for further 
evidentiary hearing in order to allow Defendant to better 
prepare for a second trial than he and his counsel did for 
the first. The fact that Plaintiff's establishment of "need" 
had been based upon her and the children living within the 
limited means available to them up to and prior to the trial 
was correctly perceived by the Court of Appeals as a problem 
characteristic of cases such as these characterized as 
11
 threshold cases" wherein the fruits of the investment are 
never received by the supporting spouse prior to the divorce 
initiation after an extended period of "investments". 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals1 decision creating the remedy of 
equitable restitution is the Court's answer to a problem 
addressed in previous cases for which a new remedy was 
necessary. The equitable restitution may be a refinement of 
the rehabilitative or reimbursement alimony concept, a remedy 
described by the Utah Court of Appeals in both the Peterson 
and Rayburn cases. The need for such a remedy is also 
outlined by the Utah Supreme Court in the Gardner case. 
The Court of Appeals correctly decided that under 
federal law, the custodial parent is entitled to tax 
exemptions for the children unless there is a pre-1985 
instrument ordering otherwise. As Appellant argued on 
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appeal, Section 152 of 26 U.S.C. outlines the federal law for 
income tax exemptions. The Supremacy clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, Article IV, Clause 2, says that the laws of the 
United States shall be the Supreme Law of the Land. The 
Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that 
Congress has the power to collect taxes on income. Thus, 
federal law would preempt any state law to the contrary. 
The Court of Appeals' modification of alimony and child 
support awards was based on substantial evidence in the 
record and was well within the Court's power. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1 [jr* day of June, 1988. 
L NEIL B. CRIST j f. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of June, 
1988, I hand delivered to each of the two attorneys below two 
true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellate!s Brief in 
Opposition to Respondent's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to 
the Supreme Court of Utah and to: 
Paul H. Liapis 
Gustin, Green, Stegall & Liapis 
Third Floor, New York Building 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Kent M. Kasting 
Dart, Adamson & Kasting 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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APPENDIX 
All cases cited are included in the Appendix of the 
Petition the Supreme Court of Utah for Writ of Certiorari, as 
is 26 U.S.C. Section 152. Article IV, Clause 2 of the U.S. 
Constitution and the Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution are included in the text herein. 
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